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Introduction
The major purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the demand and consumers' learning behavior in the cell phone market, using a panel data set from a large provider in Asia. Cell phone consumption is special for two important reasons. First, it is a two-stage decision problem with uncertainty. In most cases, the consumer has to choose a fee schedule and then decides how many minutes to call. Since the final payment is based on the number of minutes used and the chosen plan, a rational consumer needs to predict the usage when choosing a plan. However, the prediction is rarely accurate and the chosen plan might not be optimal ex-post. This is similar to the health (and other) insurance market. On the other hand, the consumer may not be completely clear about her own preference (utility function). This is particularly true if cell phone is a relatively new product in the market. In this paper, we develop a structural model that accounts for the sequential decision and both sources of uncertainty.
Second, under different situations, the consumer may value the cell phone usage differently. Emergency calls could be of much higher value than regular chatting. Therefore, at the same consumption level, the marginal utility derived from each additional minute could differ due to the different purpose of calling. Our model explicitly accounts for this difference by separating the total usage into two parts, the high-value part and the low-value (normal-value) part.
We assume the following scenario. The need for high-value usage is random and exogenously driven and the consumer uses exactly the number of high-value minutes that she needs. The consumer's preference over the low-value minutes is indexed by two key parameters in the utility function, one of which is assumed to be uncertain. At the first stage, the consumer chooses a plan based on her prediction of the need for highvalue usage and her prior belief of the preference over low-value usage. After the plan is chosen, she receives a signal on her preference and updates her belief. The posterior belief of the preference is used in the utility maximization, which leads to the demand for low-value usage. Then, the need for high-value usage is realized for that period and the consumer updates her prediction of the next period high-value usage. This procedure repeats in each period, beginning with the updated prediction and belief from the previous period. The dynamic learning behavior is captured by the two updating structures, both following the Bayes's rule. The time dimension of the panel data has enabled us to examine the learning empirically.
Our approach builds upon previous research mainly from two lines, the literature of telecommunication demand modeling (Train, et al 1987 , Kling and Ploeg 1991 , Park, et al 1991 , and Sung and Lee 2002 , and that of consumer learning (McFadden and Train 1996 , Miravete 2002a , Ackerberg 2003 , and Clay, et al 2004 . To our knowledge, this paper is the first empirical analysis of cell phone demand with consumer learning. Two recent articles are closely related to our research. Telang (2004) uses the same data set to estimate a demand model, but that paper does not consider the consumers' learning behavior and the utility function is assumed to be deterministic. Miravete (2003) models consumers' learning in the traditional land line phone service, using a data set from the 1986 Kentucky experiment. The current paper contributes primarily to the understanding of the consumer side in the emerging cell phone market.
We observe a significant level of learning behavior in the data, which motivates our structural model.
In Telang (2004) , the author reports a much higher level of price elasticity for the cell phone users, as compared to the results from the previous research on land line phone services. We ask the question whether the demand for cell phone is still highly elastic under the learning model and compare our results to the benchmarks from the previous literature. More generally, we hope this paper would add new empirical knowledge to the telecommunication demand and consumer learning. Besides, the separation of high-value and low value usage in the utility function seems to be a new treatment in the literature. The data are collected from a large cell phone service provider in Asia. The company certainly has some market power, but it is far from being a monopoly in the market. Due to the lack of information on the major competitors in that region, we do not consider strategic pricing behavior of the firm and thus ignore the question of optimal tariff design and its possible interaction with the consumers.
Although our model focuses on the consumer's learning about preferences and exogenous shock, it can be extended to accommodate learning about product quality.
The next section discusses the data and the motivation for our model. Section 3 explains the details of the demand model, followed by the empirical specification and estimation in section 4. The final section discusses the results and concludes the paper.
Data and Preliminary Analysis
The data set used in this study comes from a large wireless service provider in Asia. The original data include about 10,000 subscribers over 12 months. However, due to missing observations, the initial test period (the first two months), and the promotional plan offered to some special groups of consumers, the final sample we use includes 6625 subscribers over 10 months (from March to December). The company offers five regular cell phone plans, with a fixed fee and a certain number of free minutes associated with each one. A same per minute price is charged for all usage above the free minutes. The It is clear that the deviation from the optimal payment shrinks quickly over the first three months. After that, it stays relatively stable. The possible intuition could be twofold.
First, for those consumers who did deviate from the optimal payment, they tend to "learn" when the deviation is large. Second, those consumers can only correct their "mistakes" up to certain extent. There might be some uncontrollable random factors that prevent them from being optimal ex post.
Next, we look at the proportion of consumers who actually did choose the optimal plan in the month. Obviously, the number of consumers choosing the best plan increased rapidly during the first two months. This is consistent with the previous table. Both tables have suggested that the consumers were learning to improve the match between their plan choices and cell phone usage. Moreover, the learning behavior can be separated into two types, plan switching and usage adjustment. This motivates the demand model that we will discuss in the next section.
Optimal Plan

The Demand Model and Learning
Utility, Demand and Plan Choice -the Basic Model:
Following the literature of telecommunication demand analysis, we model the consumer behavior as a two-stage sequential decision problem. During the first stage, a consumer chooses a calling plan based on her prediction of the number of minutes she will call. Then, after the uncertainty is resolved, the consumer maximizes her utility by deciding how many minutes to use.
Calling plans are indexed by k, and are described by ( )
, where and are the fixed monthly fee, the free minutes allowed and the per-minute rate above the free minutes for plan k. Consumer's preference is represented by the utility
where M is the total number of cell phone minutes consumed and C is the composite good representing everything else with unit price. Notice that the utility function is quasi-linear in C and quadratic in M.
We deal with this discrete-continuous choice problem recursively, a typical approach in the related literature. Conditional on the choice of a calling plan k in the first stage, a consumer's utility maximization problem of the second stage is the following:
Where ω is consumer's income and .
Notice that the budget constraint is non-linear, due to the free minutes offered under each plan. However, it is convex and piecewise linear, with the form below:
Substitute the budget constraint into the objective function, the utility maximization problem becomes:
Depending on the value ofθ , the first order conditions are:
And they imply the following demand equations:
The above equations are intuitive. After a plan has been chosen and the monthly fee has b
Back to the first stage, the consumer need to choose a plan based on the demand eq een paid, if the satiation point is high enough (3.1a), the optimal consumption will be above the free minutes and up to the point where the marginal utility is equal to the marginal (per-minute) price. If the satiation point is lower than the number of free minutes (3.1b), the consumption should reach the satiation point and stop exactly there. If the satiation point is higher than the number of free minutes, but the marginal utility after the free minutes is lower than the marginal price (3.1c), the consumer should use up all the free minute but no more.
uations derived above, which lead to the following indirect utility function:
Suppose the consumer has perfect knowledge of θ and b, then she would simply choose a plan with the combination of , , and could be hard to predict in advance how many high-value minutes a consumer will need in the next period. To formalize this idea, we extend the basic model by decomposing the total number of used minutes into two parts, the high-value minutes ( h M ) and the lowvalue minutes ( l M ). We assume the consumer has the following utility function: 
Subject to the budget constraint:
Where ω is consumer's income and Substitute the budget constraint into the objective function, the utility
tion problem becomes:
Max U b
Where
The first order conditions are:
And they lead to the following demand equations:
e, the consumer Back to the first stag chooses a plan based on the demand equations derived above, which lead to the following indirect utility function:
Suppose the consumer knows 
.3 Uncertainty and Learning about Preference:
Up to now, our model assumes that the consumer knows her preference with ertainty (i.e. all the parameters in the utility function). The data suggest otherwise, 
. T s s s :
The signals observed by the consumer at each period;
The posterior distribution of l f at each period; θ are independent and using the current beliefs at time t s " ", the problem become the following:
Where the "expected price" 
The Maximum Likelihood Estimation:
In the data, we observe the plan choice and the total consumption for each consumer during each period. Assuming the decisions of the consumers are mutually independent, the joint probability of the observed plan choices and total consumptions for N consumers during T periods is simply the product of the individual probabilities. This leads us to the following likelihood function:
Whereγ is vector of the parameters we want to estimate; 1 γ and 2 γ are the two subsets ofγ that affect the plan choice probability and the consumption probability respectively. Subscript t indexes time periods and subscript n indexes consumers. Based on the results of the previous section, for consumer n at time t, the probability of plan choice is the following:
Based on the structure of our model, the consumer characteristics could in principle affect several different aspects of demand and learning. Besides the prior mean of low value minutes, they may shift the prior mean of high-value minutes or prior variances (and thus, the posterior variances). It is not hard to imagine that the consumers are heterogeneous in the effectiveness (speed) of learning. However, to identify those effects separately would be hard. The assumption we make is reasonable, since the low value usage should be the part that the consumers have the best knowledge, and therefore, the part that might be best explained by the observed characteristics. 
Results and Discussions
The point estimates and the standard deviations of the parameter are reported in the table below. The demand slope estimated from the model (58.9) is lower than the previous research with the same data set (99.9), as reported in Telang (2004) . However, the interpretation of this key structural parameter has to be careful. It potentially affects both the plan choice and the consumption level. Moreover, the latter is affected only when the (predicted) satiation point is high enough conditional on the chosen plan. Although it in general measure the consumers' responsiveness towards price change, to extract the demand elasticity from it is not straightforward. However, based on its scale, the cell phone users do seem to be more responsive to price change than the traditional land line phone users.
Parameters
Similarly, the interpretation of the coefficients of the consumer characteristics should not be in the usual way. They do not affect the demand directly, but rather, affect the prior mean. Over time, their influence reduces as the posteriors depend more and more on the signals and realizations. Moreover, considering the scale of the observed usage, all the four covariates we use have coefficients close to zero. Although two of them are statistically significant, they are still practically insignificant in the sense that the change in the usage they could cause is almost none.
The other parameters in the table measure the learning behavior. The shrinking posterior variances of both high-value and low-value usage can be obtained from the estimates.
We conclude the paper by discussing several issues in this research. First, as mentioned above, the strategic pricing behavior of the firm is completely ignored.
Second, our data only include those consumers whole stay with this provider for the whole period. We do not have adequate information on those who signed up later or cancelled the service earlier. Service cancellation would be particularly interesting to explore, since the consumers who were already in the basic plan might find out even that plan was not worth the price based on their preferences. This could further illustrate the learning behavior. Third, as also discussed in Telang (2004), we do not have reliable income data, and this restricts our choice of the utility function. In case the above information becomes available in the future, it will be very interesting to extend our study to address those issues.
